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- Apple Confidential
-
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- WINDOWS VS. OS/2: THE WINNER IS OS/2
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-
- From: Michael Mace, Michael Bobrowicz; Competitive Analysis/Mkt. Intelligence
- Contact: Michael Mace, MACE1
-
- _______
- SUMMARY
-
- At the start of Comdex, Microsoft and IBM released a statement clarifying the
- relationship between OS/2 and Windows, and giving more details on the future of
- OS/2. The statement strengthens the position of OS/2, assigning Windows to
- price-sensitive users and those with limited hardware. Implicitly, OS/2 is
- also now a 386-only operating system. This is what we expected the market to
- do on its own, so the positioning is not revolutionary.
-
- The most important element of the announcement is that Microsoft and IBM have
- now formally split the PC operating environments into two incompatible
- segments. Some PC customers, especially business purchasers of 286 systems,
- may feel betrayed by the change in positioning. Other customers, in the
- low-end markets assigned to Windows, may feel left behind. Apple has a big
- opportunity to promote Macintosh as the only graphically-based machine with a
- single OS ranging from low end to high end.
-
-
- Most industry analysts are at Comdex, so this report is compiled from a mix of
- press releases and newspaper reports. Direct quotes are taken from the
- IBM/Microsoft press release. We will include more information in our upcoming
- report on Comdex.
-
-
- ______________________________
- SITUATION: THE FUTURE OF OS/2
-
- The announcements made by IBM and Microsoft included the following:
-
-
- •OS/2 Configuration
-
- --The "Platform of the 90s" is a PC with an Intel 386 or 486, 4 MB RAM, and a
- 60 MB hard disk. (This is now implicitly the entry level for OS/2 in the long
- term.)
-
- --IBM and Microsoft will try to make OS/2 run on a 2 MB system (the current
- official limit is 3 MB, but in actual use it is 4-5 MB).
-
- --Systems with 4MB of memory will be able to take "full advantage of advanced
- system features." (In other words, the low-memory version of OS/2 will have
- features removed. Apparent clients for removal will be the High Performance
- File System, LAN features, and advanced applications.)
-
-
- •386 vs. 286
-
- --A 386 version of OS/2 will be released in 1990. Developer tools for that
- version will be available by year-end 1989. (These were both expected.)
-
- --New high-performance programs and server software should be written directly
- to the 386 version of OS/2. (This is a change; it essentially means that
- developers should dump the 286 version of OS/2. After all, who makes
- low-performance business software?)
-
- --Future enhancements to OS/2 will include special server support, Department
- of Defense security, and "full object-oriented features and symmetrical
- multiprocessing." These will work only on the 386-specific version of OS/2.
- (Another nail in the coffin for 286-based OS/2.)
-
-
- •The niche for Windows
-
- --Windows is for use on systems with less than a 30 MB hard disk and less than
- 3 MB RAM. Microsoft said future releases of Windows will not include advanced
- OS features such as threads, 32-bit flat memory, distributed processing, or
- long file names.
-
- --IBM and Microsoft will make graphically-based applications available on OS/2
- before Windows, after mid-1990. (This implies that Microsoft will release some
- new Windows applications in the first half of 1990, something we had expected.)
-
- --Software developers who are not currently working on Windows applications
- should go directly to OS/2.
-
- --There were also reports that IBM officials said they will not bundle Windows
- with any IBM machines. (If true, this was a switch from earlier reports. Of
- course, Windows might well be bundled with DOS next year, making that a moot
- point. This item was from a single source and we have not yet confirmed it.)
-
-
- •RISC
-
- --IBM and Microsoft intend "to develop OS/2 32-bit technology that is portable,
- along with its applications, to other hardware instruction sets, e.g., RISC."
-
-
- •Extended Edition
-
- --Finally, IBM and Microsoft will work to make Extended Edition functions
- "available to all users." (This implies future server software which would
- provide Extended Edition services to client PCs.) IBM LAN Server and Microsoft
- LAN Manager will converge and become identical over time.
-
-
- __________________________________________
- SCENARIO: FUN TODAY, COMPETITION TOMORROW
-
-
- •Short Term: Fun Times for Apple
-
- Although the announcements did not break a lot of ground, they clarified a
- number of important gray areas. IBM and Microsoft had left some of these gray
- areas alone because clarifying them would anger some customers and developers.
- Now that Big Blue bit the bullet, Apple has an opportunity to capitalize on
- hurt feelings in the PC-standard world. The injured groups include:
-
- --People who bought 286-based PCs. When IBM and Microsoft announced OS/2 two
- and a half years ago, they said it would be optimized for the 286 processor.
- Now it is abundantly clear that the long-term direction of OS/2 is to the 386
- chip. Some customers who bought 286-based machines like the IBM Model 50z will
- feel betrayed--and justifiably so.
-
- --Windows developers. Microsoft had a choice between upsetting small
- third-party developers of Windows software, and upsetting IBM and the big
- software developers who did not work in Windows. Microsoft chose to jettison
- the small developers. Although we still think Windows will linger for some
- time, Microsoft has essentially said that it does not have a very interesting
- future. This will discourage new developers and customers, reducing the
- returns to Windows software vendors. The theme of Microsoft abusing
- third-party developers is not new, but this will reinforce it.
-
- --Low-end customers. People in markets like low-end business, education, and
- the home will apparently be offered Windows. It's not clear how they will feel
- about buying a lame duck operating environment. Apple could probably make this
- an issue.
-
- We'll be interested to see if Microsoft attempts to reposition Windows and
- promote it in the future, or if it will just let the environment dwindle. Our
- guess is that Microsoft will try to do something to put a good light on the
- situation. But given the clear pro-OS/2 message that was sent to developers,
- that will be difficult.
-
-
- • Longer-Term: OS/2 Gets its Act Together
-
- As painful as the announcements were for IBM and Microsoft they were necessary
- in order to get OS/2 on the right track for the 1990s. The recommended
- hardware platform for OS/2 will be affordable to many businesses by this time
- next year, about the same time that applications will start to appear. The
- decision to embrace the 386 enthusiastically will enable Microsoft to add a
- much more robust architecture to OS/2, without dealing with all the problems of
- the 286.
-
- OS/2 may become a realistic purchase for some companies in 1990, but will not
- reach critical mass until later. In the long run, however, IBM and Microsoft
- have laid a fairly good-looking foundation for growth.
-
- EE Evolution. The changes in Extended Edition may generate new customer
- questions for Apple. Now that IBM and Microsoft have agreed to produce a
- single OS for networked PCs, more customers might start to look for support of
- Apple's protocols within Extended Edition. Getting support for those
- protocols, rather than matching EE feature for feature, will probably be the
- most important issue for Apple. IBM is unlikely to deliver Apple protocol
- support, but Microsoft might be willing to do so.
-
- RISC futures. By confronting the RISC issue directly, IBM and Microsoft have
- broadened OS/2's potential appeal, and have raised the possibility of a PC
- migration from CISC to RISC technology. Apple has not yet publicly tackled
- this issue. Although most customers do not care about RISC today, the
- announcement might eventually create pressure for other companies to articulate
- their transition plans. IBM's handling of the transition from DOS to OS/2
- gives a very good model of what not to do.
-
-
- _________________________________
- IMPLICATIONS: KEY APPLE MESSAGES
-
- The announcement has two important implications for Apple:
-
- --Capitalize on our consistent architecture. Macintosh does not force
- customers through the sort of disruptive transitions now being faced by PC
- buyers. In particular, the evolution of Macintosh does not abandon entire
- classes of customers the way the OS/2 will abandon the 286. System 7, which
- will ship at about the same time as the 386 version of OS/2, is a very
- interesting counterpoint to it. Apple's offering runs on a very large range of
- machines, and is compatible with most existing software.
-
- To businesses, the smoother transitions message is likely to be very effective.
- But in other markets, the announcement could have an even bigger impact.
- Customers in the apparent target market for Windows -- price-sensitive areas
- like home, education, and small business -- may be reluctant to buy an
- environment with a questionable long-term future. Microsoft and IBM have
- intentionally undercut Windows in these markets in order to position OS/2 in
- business. This creates big openings for Apple.
-
-
- --Appeal to abused developers. Developer discontent with Microsoft is
- currently very high. This creates evangelism opportunities for Apple.
-
-
- In the long term, Microsoft and IBM are finally laying a realistic foundation
- for the growth of OS/2. However, the real transition is only beginning, and it
- will be very painful for customers and developers. Now is the best time to
- emphasize the rough transitions issue; it's a "window" of vulnerability in the
- PC world that will remain open for the next 18 months or so.
-
-
- ______________________
- We welcome your comments. Please link us with your questions and suggestions.
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